The problem of interpretation takes unified linguistic structures as given and inquires about how the unity of such structures arises from their meaningful constituents and their mode of composition. Collins's problem of unity is concerned with the unity of linguistic meanings, which he defines as "invariant interpretations of linguistic types" (6).īut what precisely is Collins's problem of unity? To clarify this, he distinguishes between the problem of interpretation and the problem of combination. Faced with this problem, Russell insisted that a proposition is "essentially a unity", and that "when analysis has destroyed the unity, no enumeration of constituents will restore the proposition" - a response that seemed to deepen the mystery rather than solve it.ĭespite using Russell as the starting point, Collins's problem of unity is not a metaphysical problem - the problem, as he sees it, is not something that arises because of a given ontological commitment to complexes (Russellian propositions, facts, Fregean thoughts, etc.). to unite a, b, and R, only leads to an infinite regress of relations and never yields unity. Given such understanding of propositions, Russell was faced with Bradley's objection: what is the difference between a, b, and R, taken together, and the complex aRb? Since relations, for Russell, are universals that can occur both in a relating role and in a non-relating role (as just another term), the problem for him is especially difficult - adding further relations R*, R**, etc. For example, the Russellian proposition Alice's being wise (which may be written as *Alice is wise*) is constituted for Russell solely out of the particular girl Alice and the universal wisdom. At the time, Russell thought of propositions as complexes composed of two types of "terms" or entities - particulars ("things") and universals ("concepts").
He starts off by presenting the problem of unity that faced Russellian propositions in 1903. The problem is an old and arduous one, dating at least to Plato, and it is often put as follows: What is the difference between a mere list of words such as "wise, Alice, is" and a meaningful sentence such as "Alice is wise"? The latter possesses a unity of some sort, but what is the exact nature of such unity and how does it come about? In The Unity of Linguistic Meaning, John Collins sheds some interesting new light on the problem and proposes an original solution that draws on the lessons from early analytic philosophers, contemporary philosophy of language, and linguistics.Ĭollins's problem of unity must be differentiated from the problems of ontological unity addressed by Russell, Frege, and others, though Collins finds important lessons in their work. The so-called "problem of the unity of the proposition" has received much renewed interest recently.
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